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ABSTRACT 
Many developing countries have been integrating multiple tax brackets within the reforms of their respective tax regimes. 
Since tax systems were introduced in Asian countries several centuries ago, the determinants of tax compliance have 
been found to differ between countries. No universal findings are highlighted by researchers pertaining to genuine 
tax compliance determinants among countries sharing similar tax systems, cultures and ethnicities. The present paper 
attempts to reveal the determinants of tax compliance in Malaysia in a self-assessment system (SAS) with special emphasis 
on individual taxpayers. Four tax compliance determinants are examined: the probability of being audited; the perception 
of government spending; tax rates; and the role of the tax authority. From a survey of 1,073 respondents, the results 
show that all four determinants have a significant impact on tax compliance. The results of the present study may be 
useful for policymakers in relation to improving tax compliance in light of the four factors. By identifying the a fore 
mentioned determining factors, the present study further contributes by providing evidence of other key tax compliance 
determinants in a developing country, particularly in Asia, that is generally under researched. These determinants 
are expected to affect tax compliance behaviour in other countries that have similar taxpayer backgrounds, cultures, 
economic environments and policies. The present study may also be utilised to provide further information to assist tax 
authorities in other Asian countries to improve their respective SAS plans in the future.
Keywords: Tax compliance; perceptions; equity and fairness; self-assessment system
ABSTRAK
Kajian berhubung pematuhan cukai terutamanya di negara yang sedang membangun telah menjadi semakin penting. 
Terdapat banyak negara sedang membangun telah merubah regim cukai mereka kepada kurungan cukai yang pelbagai, 
termasuk cukai langsung dan tidak langsung. Sejak sistem cukai diperkenalkan di negara-negara Asia beberapa abad 
yang lalu, faktor penentu pematuhan cukai didapati berbeza dalam kalangan negara-negara tersebut. Masih lagi tiada 
penemuan yang universal yang dapat diketengahkan oleh penyelidik berkaitan penentu pematuhan cukai yang sebenar 
dalam kalangan negara-negara tersebut yang memiliki sistem cukai yang sama serta ciri-ciri budaya dan etnik yang 
serupa. Kajian ini bertujuan untuk mendedahkan penentu pematuhan cukai di Malaysia, di bawah sistem cukai taksir 
sendiri (SAS) dengan menumpukan khususnya terhadap pembayar cukai individu. Empat penentuan pematuhan cukai 
telah diuji iaitu kebarangkalian untuk diaudit, persepsi terhadap perbelanjaan kerajaan, kadar cukai dan peranan pihak 
berkuasa cukai. Berdasarkan kajian soal selidikt erhadap 1,073 pembayar cukai individu, kajian ini mendapati bahawa 
kempat-empat penentu yang diuji member kesan signifikan terhadap pematuhan cukai. Hasil kajian ini mungkin berguna 
kepada penggubal polisi percukaian dari segi bagaimana pematuhan cukai boleh ditingkatkan melalui empat faktor 
penentu tersebut. Melalui ke semua empat factor penentu ini, kajian ini seterusnya menyumbang dengan memberikan 
bukti akan kewujudan penentu utama pematuhan cukai yang lain di sebuah negara sedang membangun, terutamanya 
di Asia yang sebelum ini pernah dikaji. Penentu ini dijangka mampu memberi kesan terhadap gelagat pematuhan cukai 
di negara lain yang mempunyai pembayar cukai yang mempunyai latar belakang yang hampir sama dari segi budaya, 
persekitaran ekonomi dan polisi. Kajian ini telah memberikan maklumat lanjut untuk membantu penguat kuasa cukai 
di negara ini untuk memperbaiki sistem cukai taksir sendiri mereka di masa hadapan.
Kata kunci: Pematuhan cukai; persepsi; kesamaan dan keadilan; sistem taksir sendiri
INTRODUCTION
The issue of tax compliance has long been discussed by 
many researchers. The study by Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972) is among the earliest in this field. Allingham 
and Sandmo (1972) investigate the determinants of tax 
compliance in the US using psychological and economic 
approaches. Tax compliance is conceptually defined in 
various ways. For example, Andreoni et al. (1998) claim 
that tax compliance should be defined as the taxpayers’ 
willingness to obey tax laws in order to obtain an economic 
equilibrium in a country. Kirchler (2007) provide a simpler 
definition in which tax compliance is depicted as the most 
neutral term to describe taxpayers’ willingness to pay 
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their taxes. A wider definition of tax compliance provided 
by Song and Yarbrough (1978) suggests that due to the 
remarkable aspect of the operation of the tax system in 
the US, which is largely based on self-assessment and 
voluntary compliance, tax compliance should be defined 
as the taxpayers’ ability and willingness to comply with 
tax laws that are determined by ethics, legal environment 
and other situational factors at a particular time and place. 
Similarly, several tax authorities, including the Malaysian 
tax authority, define tax compliance as the ability and 
willingness of taxpayers to comply with tax laws; declare 
the correct income in each year; and pay the right amount 
of taxes on time (IRS 2009; ATO 2009; IRB 2009). 
 Alm (1991) and Jackson and Milliron (1986) define 
tax compliance as the reporting of all incomes and 
payments of all taxes by fulfilling the provisions of laws, 
regulations and court judgments. Another definition of 
tax compliance is a person’s act of filing their tax returns; 
declaring all taxable income accurately; and disbursing 
all payable taxes within the stipulated period without 
having to wait for follow-up actions from the authority 
(Singh 2003). Furthermore, tax compliance has also been 
examined from two perspectives: compliance in terms of 
administration; and compliance in terms of completing 
(accuracy) the tax returns (Chow 2004; Harris 1989). 
 Some authors view tax compliance from a different 
perspective. For example, Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972) describe tax compliance as an issue of ‘reporting 
an actual income’. They also claim that tax compliance 
behaviour is influenced by a situation whereby taxpayers 
have to make a decision under uncertainty (see also 
Clotfelter 1983) arising from the possibility of enjoying 
tax savings due to under-reporting income if the omission 
of the taxpayer remains unnoticed by tax authorities; or 
paying a penalty tax on the undeclared amount at a rate 
which is higher than the taxpayer would have paid had 
the income been fully declared within the specified time. 
McBarnet (2001) suggests that tax compliance should be 
perceived in three ways: committed compliance, which 
refers to taxpayers’ willingness to pay taxes without 
complaint; capitulative compliance, which describes 
the situation where taxpayers reluctantly ‘give in’ and 
pay taxes; and creative compliance, which occurs when 
taxpayers attempt to reduce taxes by taking advantage of 
possibilities to redefine income and deduct expenditures 
within the bracket of tax laws. Spicer and Lundstedt (1976) 
perceive the degrees of tax compliance as ‘a special form 
of gambling’ (which may involve likelihood of detection 
and penalties)that requires the tax authority to understand 
the factors underlying taxpayers’ decision to comply with 
tax laws.
 Some literature such as characterises and explains 
tax compliance as the output of interrelation among 
variables, which include the perception of equity,1 
efficiency2 and incidence (public finance views) (e.g., 
Allingham & Sandmo 1972; Spicer & Lundstedt 1976; 
Lewis 1982; Andreoni et al. 1998). Aspects of tax 
enforcement aspects, such as penalties and the probability 
of detection, also relate to tax compliance, while other 
labour market factors, including an individual’s wages 
and tax bracket, also contribute to tax compliance 
(Kirchler 2007). 
 Based on the definitions provided in previous 
studies, some keywords emerge that are widely and 
interchangeably used to define tax compliance. Examples 
include the words ‘obey’, ‘ability’ and ‘willingness’ 
(McBarnet 2001; Andreoni et al.1998; Kirchler 2007; 
Song &Yarbrough 1978; IRS 2009; ATO 2009; IRB 2009). 
Other key phrases relevant in defining tax compliance 
include ‘reporting all income’ (Alm 1991; Jackson & 
Milliron 1986); ‘act of filing tax returns’ (Singh 2003);and 
‘declare the correct income’ (IRS 2009; ATO 2009; IRB 
2009). In addition, some authors also include ‘timeliness’ 
and ‘right amount of tax’ (Song & Yarbrough 1978; IRS 
2009; ATO 2009; IRB 2009; Ming Ling et al. 2005) as part 
of their definitions of tax compliance. 
 The wider perspective of tax compliance is also 
illustrated in the definition provided by Andreoni et al. 
(1998), which includes the desired outcome as a result 
of obedience to tax laws such ‘to obtain an economic 
equilibrium’; and that by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) 
and Spicer and Lundstedt (1976),who place emphasis 
on the ability to ‘enjoy tax saving’ or ‘pay penalty’. 
Singh (2003) describes tax compliance as a voluntary 
action because it is performed ‘without having to wait 
for follow up actions from tax authority’. Apart from the 
aforementioned definitions of tax compliance, Song and 
Yarbrough (1978) include some factors of compliance 
in their definition when stating that tax compliance 
is ‘determined by ethics, legal environment and other 
situational factors’.
 Since many empirical studies exist that attempt to 
define tax compliance, tax compliance is defined, for the 
purposes of the present study, as the taxpayers’ willingness 
to comply with tax laws; declare the correct income; claim 
the correct deductions, relief and rebates;and pay all taxes 
on time, which is derived from various aforementioned 
definitions (IRS 2009, ATO 2009, IRB 2009, Alm 1991, 
Jackson & Milliron 1986; Kirchler 2007).
PREVIOUS RESEARCH-TAX COMPLIANCE DETERMINANTS
Economic Factors  Economic factors, in relation to tax 
compliance, refer to actions that are associated with the 
costs and benefits of performing the actions (Loo 2006). 
Hasseldine (1993); Song and Yarbrough (1978); and 
Torgler and Schneider (2005) assume that taxpayers are 
rational economic evaders who willlikely assess the costs 
and/or benefits of evasion (tax savings, see Allingham & 
Sandmo1972). The taxpayers will attempt to minimise 
their tax liability, for example, by intentionally under 
reporting their income and will enjoy tax savings if they 
are not detected by the tax authorities. On the other hand, 
the taxpayersare willing to pay more, including a penalty, 
if they are caught (Song &Yarbrough 1978; Somasundram 
2005; Torgler 2007). In the following subsections, tax 
compliance determinants associated with economic factors 
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(i.e., tax rates; tax audits; perceptions toward government 
spending; and the role of the tax authority; are explored 
in more detail.
Tax Rates  Clotfelter (1983) claims that “reducing tax rates 
is not the only policy that has the potential to discourage 
tax evasion”, but the tax rate is an important factor in 
determining tax compliance behaviour, although the exact 
impact remains unclear and debatable (Kirchler 2007). 
Clotfelter also suggests that a significant relationship 
exists between tax rates and evasion, particularly since tax 
rates can be used as an instrument that can be manipulated 
for policy goals. To this end, raising marginal tax rates is 
likely to further encourage taxpayers to evade tax (Witte 
& Woodbury 1985; Ali et al. 2001; Torgler 2007),although 
lowering tax rates does not necessarily increase tax 
compliance (Trivedi et al. 2004; Kirchler 2007). This 
uncertainty and conflicting issue (for example, reducing 
tax rates to increase compliance) has attracted the attention 
of tax researchers attempting to uncover more certain and 
concrete evidence of the impact of tax rates on evasion. 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) examine the existence of 
relationships between actual income, tax rates, penalties 
and investigation; and tax evasion using statistical 
modelling. They conclude that taxpayers may choose 
either to fully report income or report less, irrespective of 
tax rates. Tax rates appear to be insignificant in determining 
tax evasion. However, a study by Tanzi (1980), which 
uses an econometric model to analyse aggregate data in 
an effort to explain the relationship between marginal 
tax rates and evasion, finds that tax rates are positively 
correlated with tax evasion in the US.
 However, other economic models of rational 
compliance decisions perceive tax rates as having a mixed 
impact on tax compliance or predict that increasing tax 
rates will increase compliance behaviour (Kirchler et al. 
2008). In contrast with Allingham and Sandmo (1972), 
various studies find that increasing tax rates encourages 
non-compliant behaviour or produces mixed findings (see 
Pommerehne & Wech-Hannemann 1996; Park & Hyun 
2003). Porcano (1988) claims that tax rates have no effect 
on tax compliance, while most experimental studies find 
that increasing tax rates leads to tax evasion (Alm et al. 
1992; Friedland et al. 1978; Park & Hyun 2003). Since 
the impact of tax rates is debatable (positive, negative 
or no impact on evasion), Kirchler et al. (2008) and 
McKerchar and Evans (2009) suggest that the degree of 
trust between taxpayers and the government has a major 
role in ascertaining the impact of tax rates on compliance. 
A high tax rate can be perceived as unfair treatment in the 
eyes of taxpayers when trust is low and the same level 
of tax rate can be interpreted as a contribution to the 
community when trust is high (Kirchler et al. 2008). 
 In summary, evidence suggests that tax rates have 
a mixed impact on tax compliance. According to extant 
studies, decreasing tax rates will not necessarily increase 
compliance (Kirchler et al. 2008), while increasing tax 
rates will not necessarily decrease compliance (Allingham 
& Sandmo 1972). 
Tax Audits Tax audits, audit rates and prior audit 
experience are ambiguously discussed in relation to 
tax compliance. Some studies claim that audits have a 
positive impact on tax evasion3 (e.g., Jackson & Jaouen 
1989; Shanmugam 2003;Dubin 2004). These findings 
suggest that in self-assessment systems (SASs), tax 
audits can play an important role and their central role 
is to increase voluntary compliance. Audits rates4 and 
the thoroughness of the audits can encourage taxpayers 
to be more prudent in completing their tax returns; 
report all income; and claim the correct deductions to 
ascertain their tax liability. In contrast, taxpayers who 
have never been audited may be tempted to report less 
than their actual income and claim false deductions. 
Butler (1993) also finds that tax audits can change 
compliance behaviour from negative to positive. These 
findings complement the studies by Witte and Woodbury 
(1985) and Beron et al. (1988). Witte and Woodbury 
(1985) study of small proprietors and find that tax audits 
have a significant role in tax compliance. However, the 
study did not empirically test individual taxpayers, thus, 
leaving room to conduct research in this area. While 
Butler (1993) and Witte and Woodbury (1985) find 
significant results pertaining to the relationship between 
tax audits and tax compliance, Beron et al. (1988) finds 
a contradictory result. Beron et al. (1988) report that 
audits do not significantly correlate with evasion for all 
of the groups examined in the study. Audits are found 
to be more effective in inducing taxpayers to over claim 
deductions rather than encouraging them to correctly 
report actual income (Beron et al.1988).
 Dubin et al. (1987) estimate the determinants of 
income tax reporting as a function of audit rates using 
state-level, time-series and cross-section data from the 
Annual Report of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for 
the period of 1977-1985. They find that higher audit rates 
often have a positive impact on income tax reporting, but 
audit rates are not always statistically significant. The 
study also finds that a spill over effect exists from tax 
audits. Taxpayers, who are not themselves audited, pay 
more in taxes when audit rates increase. From another 
point of view, Evans et al. (2005) examine the tax 
compliance of small and medium size enterprises (SME) 
in Australia. The objective of the study is to examine the 
relationship between the record keeping practices of SMEs 
and potential exposure to tax compliance problems. The 
study hypothesises that low tax compliance among SMEs 
might better encourage the tax authority to increase audits 
and investigations. The study involved 129 small business 
owners; and 130 tax practitioners and Australian Tax 
Office (ATO) auditors. Using mail surveys, the study finds 
that audit history (including frequency of audits), audit 
outcome and the type of audit of small business owners 
have a significant indirect impact on tax compliance (in 
terms of record keeping). The results also imply that 
the primary objective of small business owners when 
performing record keeping is tax compliance related 
rather than part of the management of their business. 
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Thus, as audits investigations increase, many SMEs will 
invest more effort in proper record keeping.  
 In summary, previous studies evidence that tax 
audits play an important role in increasing voluntary 
compliance. Audit rates and the thoroughness of the audits 
can potentially encourage taxpayers to be more prudent 
in completing their tax returns.
Perceptions toward Government Spending  Studies on the 
relationship between specific aspects of actual government 
spending and tax compliance, particularly on tax evasion, 
are very limited. Logically, taxpayers, especially those 
who pay high amounts of tax, are sensitive to what the 
government spends their money on. Although limited 
empirical evidence exists, it is reasonable to assume that 
taxpayers will tend to evade tax if they perceive that the 
government spends tax money lavishly and unwisely. 
However, in most developed countries, such as the UK 
which has implemented a system allowing taxpayers to 
“Pay as You Earned (PAYE)”, it is quite difficult to evade 
tax liability because deductions are made at the source 
for the majority of taxpayers’ liabilities. Unlike the UK, 
taxpayers have greater opportunities to under report 
their income and, therefore, pay less tax in countries 
(for example, Malaysia and Singapore) where PAYE 
is not as extensively used. Lewis (1982) suggests that 
attitudes should be examined to the degree to which they 
are a product of myth and misperception. The argument 
presented is when myths and misperceptions are replaced 
by knowledge, a change in attitudes towards taxation will 
occur even if the taxpayers’ basic ideology and values 
remain unchanged; and the tax law is not changed. Lewis 
(1982) also claims that misperceptions may play a major 
role in shaping fairness evaluations. Meanwhile, Roberts 
et al. (1994) also suggest that the attitude towards one’s 
own tax evasion (tax ethics) and attitudes towards other 
people’s tax evasion are very important. Therefore, if the 
government is wisely spending the national revenue for 
basic facilities, such as education, health and safety and 
public transportation, it is likely that voluntary compliance 
will increase. In contrast, if taxpayers perceive that the 
government is spending too much on things that are 
considered unnecessary or unbeneficial to them, then 
taxpayers will feel betrayed and attempt to evade.
 In summary, the government should prudently spend 
the money paid by taxpayers’ because the way in which 
the government spends money produces different levels of 
compliance. Thus, taxpayer’s perceptions are potentially 
important in the determination of their compliance 
behaviour. 
Role (Efficiency) of the Tax Authority/Government  A 
debate exists in the literature as to how the effective 
operation of the tax system by the tax authorities 
influences taxpayers’ compliance behaviour. Researchers 
from different countries have been unable to achieve 
the agreement on this issue, which appears to differ 
from country to country. Therefore, different countries 
have proposed and developed different solutions for 
the relationship between taxpayer compliance and the 
operation of the tax system.  For instance, in the US, the 
IRS views the non-compliance with tax codes as a great 
challenge, particularly since the tax gap has increased 
tremendously in the last few decades. In 1976, an IRS 
report estimated income was $75 to $100 billion - about 
7% to 9% of reported income (Clotfelter 1983). While the 
tax gap in 1976 was estimated to be higher than this figure, 
the tax gap in the US in 1993 was more than $170 billion 
ora 70% to 126% increase compared to the IRS estimate 
in 1976 (Hasseldine & Li 1999). 
 In Belgium, the total amount of tax evaded was 
estimated at 20% of income tax (Hasseldine 1993), while 
surveys across the US, Australia, the Netherlands and 
Sweden reveal that one-quarter of respondents admit to 
deliberately under-reporting their income (Hasseldine 
1993). 
 The role of the tax authority in minimising the tax gap 
and increasing voluntary compliance is very important. 
Hasseldine and Li (1999) illustrate that placing the 
government and the tax authority as the main parties that 
need to be continuously efficient in administering the tax 
system is important in order to minimise tax evasion. 
The government plays a central role by designing the 
tax system itself, as well as the specific enforcement 
and collection mechanisms (Hasseldine & Li 1999). 
Furthermore, Roth et al. (1989) suggest that in order 
to increase compliance, maximise tax revenue and be 
respected by taxpayers, the government must first have 
an economical tax system which is practicable5; they must 
discourage tax evasion and not induce dishonesty; they 
must avoid the tendency to dry up the source of the tax 
and should avoid provoking conflict and raising political 
difficulties; and they should also have a good relationship 
with the international tax regime. 
 A recent study conducted by Richardson (2008) also 
suggests that the role of the government has a significant 
positive impact on determining attitudes toward tax. 
The study attempts to investigate the determinants of 
tax evasion across 47 countries, including the USA, the 
UK, Argentina, Thailand, Canada, Chile and Brazil. 
Richardson (2008) also suggests that the government 
should increase their reputation and credibility in order 
to gain trust from the taxpayers. 
 In summary, although previous studies do not 
provide conclusive results on the measurable impact 
of governmental efficiency on compliance, researchers 
from different countries discuss the issue and some 
authors describe the role of government in inducing 
tax compliance as important and relevant in SASs (see 
Richardson 2008; Hasseldine & Li 1999).
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
The increase of compliance relative to the probability 
of being audited has received attention from many 
researchers. Allingham and Sandmo (1972) claim that 
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taxpayers will always declare their income correctly if 
the probability of detection is high. The probability of 
detection plays a significant role in reporting behaviour 
since taxpayers will declare everything if they perceive 
that they will be one of the auditees in that particular year 
(Riahi-Belkaoui 2004; Richardson 2006). Slemrod et al. 
(2001) investigate the relationship between the probability 
of being audited and taxpayers’ response. The experiment6 
indicates that taxpayers’ behaviour varies in terms of level 
of income and the probability of being audited, which 
plays a significant role in determining taxpayers’ evasion 
behaviour. However, the direction of the relationship 
(positive or negative) is not clearly stated by Slemrod et 
al. (1998). This result is also supported by Andreoni et al. 
(1998), who find that prior audit experience influences 
and increases compliance among taxpayers. Conversely, 
Young (1994) and Slemrod et al. (2001) find that the 
probability of being audited is negatively correlated with 
compliance behaviour. Following the above discussions, 
it is therefore hypothesised that:
H1 The probability of being audited is positively 
correlated with tax compliance.
 Studies on the relation between government spending 
and tax compliance, particularly concerning tax evasion, 
are very limited. Taxpayers, especially those who pay 
large amounts of tax, can be expected to be sensitive to 
how the government spends its money. Although limited 
empirical evidence exists on this topic, it is suspected that 
taxpayers will tend to evade tax if they perceive that the 
government spends tax money unwisely. If the government 
is spending the national revenue wisely for basic facilities, 
such as education, health, safety and public transportation, 
it is assumed that voluntary compliance will increase. 
In contrast, if taxpayers perceive that the government is 
spending too much on unnecessary things, taxpayers may 
feel betrayed and attempt to evade. Therefore, following 
the above discussions, it is hypothesised that:
H2  The positive perception of government spending is 
positively correlated with tax compliance.
 A theoretical economic model introduced by 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) indicates that tax audits 
have an impact on tax compliance (i.e., higher tax audits 
frequency discourages tax evasion). However, more 
complex models, such as the principal agent theory and 
game theory, suggest that tax audits and audit probability 
are difficult to portray in compliance models since the 
results are determined endogenously with tax cheating 
(Andreoni et al. 1998). Studies by Beck et al. (1991) and 
Becker et al. (1987) find that tax audit rates affect tax 
compliance. However, an experimental approach limits 
the environment to a narrow perspective compared to a 
real world or a national survey. Marrelli (1984), Wang and 
Conant (1988), Gordon (1990) and Marrelli and Martina 
(1988) find that tax audit rates have a negative association 
with evasion. In contrast, Virmani (1989) indicates that 
tax audit rates have a positive association with evasion, 
meaning that higher rates will encourage people to cheat. 
Since previous studies indicate that tax audit rates affect 
tax compliance behaviour, the awareness of offences and 
tax audits are presumed to have a significant influence 
as well. If the taxpayers are aware of the offence and 
the consequences of non-compliance, they may not 
cheat. On the other hand, if taxpayers are unaware of the 
implications of being dishonest, they may cheat because 
they presume that they will not be detected and could 
save money. Therefore, following the above discussions, 
it is hypothesised that:
H3  Tax rates are positively correlated with tax 
compliance.
 No conclusive evidence exists concerning how tax 
authorities can influence taxpayers’ compliance behaviour, 
as researchers from different countries are unable to reach 
agreement on this issue. The lack of consensus is due 
to the fact that each country has their own approach in 
ascertaining taxpayers’ compliance behaviour. In the US, 
for example, the IRS views tax non-compliance as a big 
challenge and has dealt with the issue carefully since the 
tax gap has increased tremendously in the last decade. 
The role of the tax authority in minimising the tax gap 
and increasing voluntary compliance is very important. 
Hasseldine and Li (1999) consider the government 
and tax authority to be the main parties that need to be 
continuously efficient in administering the tax system in 
order to minimise tax evasion. The government plays the 
central role in designing the tax systems, enforcement and 
collection (Hasseldine & Li 1999). 
 Furthermore, Roth et al. (1989) suggest that in order 
to increase compliance, maximise tax revenue and be 
respected by taxpayers, a government must first have 
an economical tax system that is practicable7; and they 
must discourage tax evasion and induce honesty, while 
avoiding the tendency to dry up the source of the tax. 
In addition, the government must not provoke conflict 
and raise political difficulties; and should have a good 
relationship with international tax regime. A recent study 
conducted by Richardson (2006) also suggests that the role 
of a government has a significant impact on determining 
attitudes towards tax. A simpler tax system introduced by a 
government can reduce tax evasion. Therefore, following 
the above discussions, it is hypothesised that: 
H4 The role (efficiency) of the tax authority is positively 
correlated with tax compliance.
RESEARCH METHOD
The data were collected through a national survey. After 
conducting a pilot survey on a group of 23 lecturers and 
professionals in various sectors and the public (non-tax 
specialists) to improve validity and reliability, as well as 
to further refine the questions, a total of 5,500 surveys 
were mailed to individual taxpayers throughout Malaysia. 
The taxpayers were selected at random from telephone 
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directories. Kasipillai and Baldry (1998) assert that the 
selection of samples from local telephone directories may 
exclude low income earners who are less likely to have 
a telephone. However, in the Malaysian context, two 
factors help to overcome this potentially results-biasing 
position. Firstly, since many low income earners are 
unlikely to lodge tax returns in the Malaysian SAS, their 
possible exclusion from the survey is not considered to be 
of major concern given that the focus is on taxpayers who 
have had direct experience with the SAS. Specifically, in 
Malaysia, an individual who earns less than RM 25,501 
(USD 8,226) per annum does not have to lodge a tax return 
(IRB 2010). Secondly (and perhaps more importantly), 
in Malaysia, phone ownership is very high and no ‘ex-
directory’ service is available, whereby numbers can be 
unlisted (as typical in the UK for example).Therefore, the 
employment of this sampling method in the Malaysian 
context should result in good randomisation with few 
limitations compared to other sampling approaches for 
this scale of survey8. 
 However, using a sample from a telephone directory 
approach limits one key output that may alter the results: 
the possible impact of the growth in mobile phone 
ownership, which has become significant in Malaysia. 
In early 2006, mobile penetration passed the 80 percent 
mark with subscriber numbers at the same time passing 
20 million9. The statistics were a significant jump from 
2 million subscribers in 1998.  Malaysia has the second 
highest mobile penetration in South East Asia after 
Singapore (South East Asian Mobile Communications & 
Mobile Data Markets Report 2006). Although the growth 
of mobile telephones is significantly higher than that of 
landlines, the ownership of landlines is both classical and 
traditional, such that owning a landline is still considered 
necessary even in households which possess more than 
one mobile phone. 
The questionnaire was prepared in both Malay (local 
language) and English versions (in the same booklet) to 
facilitate respondents and was divided into three sections: 
tax knowledge questions; tax compliance questions; and 
respondent backgrounds. A total of four tax compliance 
determinants (independent variables) were examined, as 
illustrated in Table 1: the probability of being audited 
(E1); perceptions toward government spending (E2); tax 
rates(E3); and the role of the tax authority (E4).
 To test the hypotheses, the data is analysed using 
multiple regressions (Ordinary Least Squares, OLS). 
Equation 1 is used as the base regression model to 
test the hypotheses and establish the tax compliance 
determinants.
TCi  = α + β1PROBAUDITi + β2GOVSPENDi + β3RATESi 
+  β4ROLEi + ε
where α = regression intercept,
 β = estimated coefficient,
 TCi= tax compliance score,
 PROBAUDITi= probability of being audited,
 GOVSPENDi = perception on government spending,
 RATESi = tax rates and enforcement, and
 ROLEi  = role of tax authority, and
 ε = error term.
RESULTS
Out of 5,500 surveys distributed, 71 were returned to the 
researchers due to incomplete addresses; and because the 
intended respondents have moved or were deceased. Out 
of 1,106 complete surveys returned, 1,073 (19.51 percent 
of the total sample) were usable and further analysed. In 
terms of the number of surveys distributed, 5,500 surveys 
is a considerably smaller number than 2,198,914,10 which 
is the total population of individuals taxpayers in Malaysia 
in 2006 (IRB 2006). However, Loo (2006) shows that using 
such a number of questionnaires in distribution is large 
enough to represent individual taxpayers in Malaysia. 
In addition, Sekaran (2000) suggests that the optimum 
Descriptions
The total score is derived from a set of 26 questions. The minimum total score for each 
respondent is 26 (1 mark times 26 questions, where 1 = non-compliant) and the maximum 
total score is 130 (5 times 26 questions, where 5 = very compliant).  
The probability of a taxpayer being audited or investigated by the tax authority. Minimum 
score is 1 (non-complaint) and maximum is 15 (very complaint).
Taxpayers’ perception on how the government spends taxpayers’ money or redistributes 
the tax collection. The minimum score is 1 (non-complaint), and the maximum is 15 (very 
complaint).
Taxpayers’ perception on the tax rates. The minimum score is 1 (non-complaint) and the 
maximum is 15 (very complaint).
The role of the tax authority in administering the tax system (efficiency, refunds, response 
with complaints, customer services,etc). The minimum score is 1 (non-complaint) and the 
maximum is 15 (very complaint).
Variables
Tax compliance 
(dependent 
variable)
Probability of 
being audited (E1)
Perception of 
government 
spending (E2)
Tax rates (E3) 
The role of tax 
authority (E4)
Symbol
TC
PROBAUDIT
GOVSPEND
RATES
ROLE
TABLE 1. A Description of the variables
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sample size for a total population of one million is 384 
or 0.0384 percent. Knofczynski and Mundfrom (2008) 
provide some guidelines as to the minimum sample size 
needed for accurate predictions in multiple regressions 
and suggest that in order to obtain a valid and good 
prediction in multiple regressions, the number of sample 
is determined by the number of predictors in the multiple 
regression. Since the present study attempts to analyse nine 
predictors, Knofczynski and Mundfrom (2008) suggest 
that the number of the sample should be 900.
 The respondents are comprised of 588 (55%) females 
and 483 (45%) males, while 2 respondents did not mention 
their gender. Since the present study emphasises individual 
taxpayers, a minimum age of 20 years old was considered 
reasonable. There were 8 age groups involved in the 
present study with a 5-year range in each group, with the 
exception of the’ above 56 years old’ category. The largest 
group consists of 252 (24%) respondents aged between 26 
and 30 years old, while the group of above 56 years old has 
the lowest number of 14 (1%) respondents. Cumulatively, 
respondents aged between 20 and 40 years old make up 
the largest portion with 749 responses (70%). A total of 
768 (72%) respondents are married; 280 (26%) are single; 
and 20 (2%) are widows/ widowers. 
 Table 2 reports the Pearson correlation matrix for 
dependent and independent variables. It shows results 
that indicate that all of the independent variables are 
found to be significantly correlated with tax compliance 
(TC). The coefficient of correlation between each 
independent variable and TC was stable at between r = 
.36 to r = .60. The highest correlation was between TC 
and the taxpayer’s perception of tax rates (RATES) (r 
= .60) followed by the probability of a taxpayer being 
audited (PROBAUDIT); the role of the tax authority (ROLE); 
and the taxpayer’s perception of government spending 
(GOVSPEND). The significant correlations here suggest that 
all independent variables are significant determinants of 
tax compliance. 
TABLE 2. Pearson correlation matrix for dependent (TC) 
and independent variables
  1 2 3 4 5
 
1. TC 1.000     
2. PROBAUDIT .551** 1.000    
3. GOVSPEND .358** -.022 1.000   
4. ROLE .394** -.01388 .411** 1.000  
5. RATES -.594** .390 -.035 .036 1.000
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
 The results from multiple and stepwise multiple 
regressions that were reported in Table 3 indicated that tax 
compliance is influenced by all the four selected variables 
namely RATES, PROBAUDIT, ROLE and GOVSPEND. Stepwise 
multiple regression also suggests that RATES becomes 
the main factor with a beta coefficient of .442, followed 
by PROBAUDIT(β= .388), ROLE (β= .272) and GOVSPEND 
(β =.270). The estimated correlation coefficient (R) and 
estimated coefficient of determination (R2) are estimated 
within the range of .825 and .680, respectively. The 
results in Table 3 also validate that when all variables are 
significant, no difference exists between the results of OLS 
and stepwise multiple regressions. 
 The results imply that taxpayers that have a high 
probability of being audited have a tendency to be more 
compliant. Subsequently, hypotheses H1 (probability of 
being audited is positively correlated with tax compliance) 
is accepted. Apart from that, the positive perception of 
government spending and the efficient role played by 
the tax authority are also significant determinants that 
cultivate positive compliant behaviour among individual 
taxpayers in Malaysia. Again, hypotheses H2 and H4are 
also accepted. Tax rates are also a negatively significant 
determinant in influencing tax compliance behaviour 
in Malaysia. The results indicate that high tax rates can 
potentially increase non-compliance behaviour as higher 
TABLE 3. Results of multiple regression and stepwise multiple regression 
 Multiple regression  Stepwise multiple regression 
Variables Coefficient t VIF Coefficient t VIF
(Constant) 26.872* 25.050  26.872* 25.050  
PROBAUDIT 1.500* 20.525 1.181 1.500* 20.525 1.181 
GOVSPEND .991* 14.136 1.207 .991* 14.136 1.207 
ROLE  1.192* 14.245 1.208 1.192* 14.245 1.208 
RATES -1.665* 23.370 1.185 -1.665* 23.370 1.185
Model fit:           
 R .825   .825       
 R2 .68   .68       
 Adjusted R2 .679   .679       
 Std. error 6.68   6.68      
 F statistic 562.4   562.4  
Notes: Dependent variable – Tax compliance
* Significant at p < 0.10
**  Significant at p < 0.05
*** Significant at p < 0.01
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income earners will be more reluctant to comply because 
they will have to pay higher income tax. Subsequently, 
H3 is also accepted.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The present study examines factors affecting taxpayers’ 
behaviour. Four potential determinants of tax compliance 
are examined in this study: the probability of being 
audited; the perceptions of government spending; tax rates; 
and the role of the tax authority. Using tax compliance 
(TC) as the dependent variable, the results suggest that 
tax compliance is influenced by the probability of being 
audited; perceptions of government spending; tax rates; 
and the role of the tax authority. Interestingly, tax rates 
(negative association) not only become another factor that 
affects tax compliance behaviour in relation to the SAS in 
Malaysia in the present study, but also the most significant 
determinant (refer to Table 3).Thus, hypothesis H1is 
accepted and the finding supports the results of Allingham 
and Sandmo (1972) and Eriksen and Fallan (1996). The 
second most significant determinant of tax compliance is 
the probability of being audited. The results of the present 
study suggest that a high probability of being audited will 
encourage tax compliance. Moreover, positive perceptions 
of how the government spends taxpayers’ money will also 
potentially increase tax compliance.
 With regards to the probability of being audited, 
previous studies (e.g., Allingham & Sandmo 1972; 
Jackson & Jaouen 1989;Shanmugam 2003; Dubin 2004; 
Riahi-Belkaoui 2004; Richardson 2006; Andreoni et 
al. 1998; Bergman 1998; Verboon &Van Dijke 2007; 
Eisenhauer 2008) find that a high probability of being 
audited or detected will encourage taxpayers to be more 
compliant (positive relationship). However, some other 
studies find contradicting result, concluding that a high 
probability of being audited will potentially decrease 
compliance creating a negative association (e.g., Young 
1994; Slemrod et al. 2001; Braithwaite et al. 2009). In 
addition, Slemrod et al. (1998) does not clearly state the 
direction (either positive or negative). Therefore, since a 
high probability of auditing can encourage tax compliance, 
the tax authority should increase their number of audit 
samples so that tax compliance will increase; the tax 
gap will decrease; and the objectives of the SAS will be 
achieved. 
 With regards to the perceptions of taxpayers on 
government spending, those who engage in tax evasion 
often justify such behaviour by suggesting that the 
government wastes tax revenue and spends unwisely. 
Consequently, such a negative perception can decrease 
voluntary compliance in the long run (Braithwaite et al. 
2009). It is expected that if the government spending of tax 
money is justifiable, voluntary compliance will increase. 
In contrast, if taxpayers perceive that the government 
spends too much on unnecessary and costly expenditures 
that are of little benefit to citizens, taxpayers may feel 
betrayed and attempt to evade. In justifying one’s own 
behaviour, a person has the tendency to blame and believe 
that the cause is due to external factors. For example, “he is 
a tax evader because he is a bad person; I am a tax evader 
because the government wastes my taxes (and that’s not 
my fault)” (McKerchar & Evans 2009). Therefore, to 
increase tax compliance among the taxpayers and thus the 
tax collection, the government should remove a possible 
cause for such behaviour by spending the taxpayers’ 
money wisely.
 The issue of perception, specifically perception of 
government spending, is really an issue which is beyond the 
direct control of the tax authorities because perception also 
depends on the personal opinions of taxpayers. Kirchler 
(2007) classifies this factor as a ‘social psychological 
perspective’ and outlines that this perspective is difficult 
to deal with in order to increase tax compliance. Despite 
the difficulty, the negative association between perception 
and tax compliance found in the present study mandates 
serious consideration by the Malaysian government. The 
government should respond positively by wisely spending 
taxpayers’ money and fulfilling the nation’s (taxpayers’) 
basic needs, including infrastructure, medical allocations 
and education, in order to increase taxpayers’ confidence 
in the government. Unnecessary expenditures by the 
government will cultivate tax non-compliant behaviour 
according to the results of the present study. 
 As such, to the IRB, low compliance rates and 
non-compliance influence the frequency of their tax 
audit activities and the practice of imposing penalties. 
However, previous literature (see Beck et al. 1991; 
Becker et al. 1987) suggests that taxpayers’ compliance 
behaviour is not solely influenced by tax rates and the 
frequency of tax audits (although the present study did 
not find these factors to be significant), but also by 
the taxpayer’s level of tax knowledge; attitudes and 
perceptions of the tax system, particularly in relation to 
the fairness of the system; and the inadequacy of the tax 
authority’s enforcement strategies (Kirchler 2007; Torgler 
2007; Richardson 2006). For example, the role of the 
tax authority in minimising the tax gap and increasing 
voluntary compliance is found to be very important as 
Hasseldine and Li (1999) consider the government to be 
the main influencing factor in relation to tax evasion. The 
government plays a central role in designing and enforcing 
the tax systems; and collecting taxes (Hasseldine & Li 
1999). Spicer and Becker (1980), Andreoni et al. (1998) 
and Wenzel (2003) claim that if a specific group perceive 
their tax liability is higher than other groups, then tax 
evasion may occur among the group members. At the 
social level, tax compliance with regards to fairness is 
viewed as a national concern. If taxpayers perceive the 
tax system as unfair, tax evasion is more likely to occur 
(Allingham & Sandmo 1972; Baldry 1999). 
 The present study further contributes to the field 
by providing evidence of other key tax compliance 
determinants in a developing country, particularly in Asian 
countries that have been previously under researched. 
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These determinants may also affect tax compliance 
behaviour in other countries that have similar taxpayer 
backgrounds; culture; economic environments; and 
policies. Therefore, the findings of the present study may 
be useful for tax authorities in similar countries when 
developing their respective SAS plans. 
It is acknowledged that the present study has a number 
of limitations. The use of a self-report survey may be less 
reliable, especially when the information sought on tax 
is sensitive; potentially incriminating; or embarrassing 
(Richardson 2008). The actual behaviour of the subjects 
may vary from the responses given. While acknowledging 
this constraint, it is believed that the research method 
employed is the most suitable way to predict taxpayers’ 
compliance behaviour, as direct questions (face to face) 
might lead respondents to answer the questions dishonestly 
and can be potentially embarrassing for respondents. 
Secondly, using telephone directories potentially limits 
responses by only facilitating contact with the head of 
households. Also, replies from landline telephone owners 
tend to include only the richer segment of the society. 
However, this issue is balanced by a high number of usable 
responses (1,073), which is relatively high compared to 
other similar tax studies. The area of tax compliance, 
particularly in regards to a SAS, offers opportunities 
for additional research. Instead of using a survey, other 
methods of data collection (for example, interviews 
or experiments) may provide different results. Future 
research could be conducted via a longitudinal study in 
which a comparison of more years might provide different 
results from the ‘point in time’ utilized in the present study. 
Using data from a tax administration and comparing this 
with data from questionnaires could also be beneficial 
as a further data source for a compliance study of this 
kind, although the chances of accessing data from a tax 
authority are very slim. 
ENDNOTES
1 An effective tax system will be less equitable when 
the wealthy evade a larger share of taxes than the poor 
(Andreoni et al.1998).
2 Any effort towards tax non-compliance affects tax 
efficiency and compliance costs. Unreported income 
distorts tax collection (Andreoni et al.1998; Lewis 1982).
3 Meaning that taxpayers who have been audited by a tax 
authority will be more compliant at some point following 
the audit.
4 Audit rates are calculated based upon the number of tax 
returns audited and divided by the number of tax returns 
accepted by a tax authority.
5 The government has suitable powers (assessment and 
collection) to administer the tax system. 
6 Using taxpayers’ tax returns for two years to compare 
the differences in reported income, deductions and tax 
liabilities. Random sampling was used.
7 The government has suitable powers (assessment and 
collection) to administer the tax system. 
8 Alternatively, a list of taxpayers could be obtained from the 
tax authority. However, it is very difficult to obtain the list 
as the tax authority is not allowed by the Income Tax Act 
1967 to reveal any taxpayers information to the public.
9 The total population in 2000 was 23.27 million compared 
to 18.38 in 1990 (27.15% increase) (The Population and 
Housing Census 2000). This figure increased to 27.46 
million in 2008 (Malaysia Department of Statistics 
2008).
10 This figure is based upon the total number of tax returns 
distributed to registered individual taxpayers. 
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